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Sales and Elections as Methods for Transferring Corporate Control
Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz*
Under standard accounts of corporate governance, capital markets play a significant role in
monitoring management performance and, where appropriate, replacing management whose
performance does not measure up. While the concept of a market for corporate control was once
controversial, now even the American Law Institute acknowledges that "transactions in control and
tender offers are mechanisms through which market review of the effectiveness of management's
delegated discretion can operate.0 Recent case law in Delaware, however, appears to have altered
dramatically the mechanisms through which the market for corporate control must operate. In particular,
the interaction of the poison pill and the Delaware Supreme Court's development of the legal standard
governing defensive tactics in response to tender offers have resulted in a decided, but as yet
unexplained, preference for control changes mediated by means of an election rather than by a market.
In this paper, we begin the evaluation of the preference for elections over markets that the Delaware
Supreme Court has not yet attempted.1 We apply to this effort both doctrinal and insights derived from

*Meyers

Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University, and Stern Professor of Law and Business,
Columbia University; and Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. This paper was improved by comments made at a
meeting of the Yale Law School Center for Corporate Law, a Corporate Governance Conference at Tel Aviv Law School,
and law and economics workshop at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Jennifer Arlen, Robert Daines, Jeffrey
Gordon, Zohar Goshen and Henry Hansmann also made helpful suggestions.
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American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance, Analysis and Recommendations 385 (1994).

2The

direct literature on this subject apparently consists of three papers, this one; Lucian Bebchuk and Oliver
Hart, "Takeover Bids, Proxy Fights and Corporate Voting" (Mimeo, Harvard Law School, 1999); and Bilge Yilmaz,
"Strategic Voting and Proxy Contests" (Mimeo, Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, Wharton, 1999). We
will compare these two papers to this one in later notes. Mikami considers a case, in a full information environment, in
which two management teams compete for the right to manage a project by winning a proxy contest among atomized
shareholders. He shows that the winning team will choose the project that the median shareholder prefers, provided that
the manager teams do not collude and are willing to tolerate considerable risk. See Kazuhiko Mikami, "Proxy Contests
and Corporate Democracy," J. Economic Behavior & Org. 353 (1999). These conditions seem hard to satisfy in the
context of his model, and the model, because it does not contemplate purchase of the company's outstanding stock by one
of the proxy contestants, does not capture closely the context that interests us.

1

an interesting but complex formal literature that has developed to understand how voting structures work
in political contests and jury deliberations. Since these contexts differ substantially from transfers of
corporate control, our analysis raises a question of fit: are voting models suitable for analyzing the
question asked here? In our view, the models do illuminate the takeover institution, but if this view is
ultimately rejected, then we will have eliminated what at least superficially appears to be a useful set of
tools.
Part 1 provides a very brief account of the doctrinal development that has given us the current
bias for elections, focusing on the last step in the process: the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.2 Part 2 then argues that economic efficiency, to be made
precise in this context below, is the appropriate normative criterion for directing the choice between
markets and elections as mechanisms for effecting a change in control that is resisted by management.
Parts 3 and 4 next develop two models which show that elections can perform badly in proxy contests in
which the principal issue is whether the target company should be sold or not. The first model assumes
that shareholder voters are well informed about the economic variables of interest and the second
supposes uncertainty about these variables.
Market sales apparently lack the defects that these models show can affect elections. Current
regulation, which facilitates competing bids, and current takeover technologies, which permit making
them, would eliminate much of the inefficiency in takeover bidding that prior models have identified if
bidders could make proposals directly to target shareholders. Then the target would be an auction
seller. A standard result in auction theory is that if the seller chooses a revenue maximizing auction
form it is a dominant strategy for bidders -- here potential acquirers -- to big their true valuations. The
dominant strategy for a maximizing seller then is to accept the winning bid. Therefore, target
shareholders would not be in a strategic situation in an auction world. As a consequence, we focus on
the possible inefficiencies arising from a judicial preference for elections (in which it is optimal for
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A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
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shareholders to act strategically) over markets as a takeover mechanism.3 In Part 5, we return to
doctrine to show how Unitrin's preference for elections over markets may be eliminated without
requiring the Delaware Supreme Court to confess error. We also suggest that, for jurisdictions with
courts less influential than those in Delaware, a statutory change to permit more sales of control would
be best.
1. Privileging Elections: Unitrin's Preclusion Standard
Fifteen years ago, the Delaware Supreme Court announced two landmark decisions that sought
to provide a framework for the legal rules governing hostile takeovers. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co.4 announced a proportionality standard of review for defensive tactics: a target board of directors
must demonstrate that a defensive response is reasonable in relation to the threat posed by a hostile
offer. Moran v. Household International, Inc.5 approved the adoption of a poison pill in anticipation of
a possible hostile offer and stated that a target board decision not to redeem a pill in the face of an actual
offer would be treated as a defensive tactic reviewable under the Unocal standard. There followed "a
remarkable struggle between the Chancery Court and the Supreme Court for Unocal's soul."6
4Takeover models in which target shareholders play strategically commonly have only one acquirer and one set of
(possibly large) shareholders. In these models, takeovers always are efficient when shareholders play pure strategies
(tender all their shares or not); takeovers also are efficient when shareholders play mixed strategies (hold out a fraction of
their shares with positive probability); but shareholders may tender less frequently than they should when they play mixed
strategies and the number of shareholders is very large. See, e.g., Thomas H. Noe and Lynn Pi, "Learning Dynamics,
Genetic Algorithms, and Corporate Takeovers," 24 J. Economic Dynamics and Control 189 (2000); Bengt Holmstrom
and Barry Nalebuff, "To the Raider Goes the Surplus? A Reexamination of the Free Rider Problem," 1 J. Economics and
Management Strategy 37 (1992). Bebchuk and Hart develop a model in this genre and suggest policies to reduce
inefficiencies in tendering. As said above, an auction environment adds players on the buying side and thus ameliorates
these inefficiencies. It is a separate question, not considered here, whether even an efficient auction process would
inefficiently dampen search for poorly performing targets.
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A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and what we can do about it), forthcoming Del. J.Corp.L. This
is, by now, a familiar story that we do not proposed to retell in any detail here. For an extended account of the evolution
of Delaware takeover doctrine, see, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate

3

Stated starkly, the question was whether the threat that shareholders would accept a hostile offer
at too low a price was so severe that a target board of directors could decline to redeem the target's
poison pill and thereby prevent the shareholders from choosing whether to accept the offer. As the
issue came to be framed, could the target board of directors "just say no." The Chancery Court decided
in favor of the primacy of shareholder choice in rather ringing language. Chancellor Allen stated"
To acknowledge that directors may employ the recent innovation of
"poison pills" to deprive shareholders of the ability effectively to accept a
noncoercive offer, after the board has had a reasonable opportunity to
explore or create alternatives or attempt to negotiate on the shareholders'
behalf, would, it seems to me, be so inconsistent with widely shared
notions of appropriate corporate governance as to threaten to diminish the
legitimacy and authority of our corporate law"7
The Delaware Supreme Court, however, resolved this struggle by fiat in Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Times, Inc.8 But while Time left us with no doubt that it rejected the Interco analysis,9 it offered
no statement of when a target board could simply decline to pull a pill.
Some clarity, if not justification, was offered in Unitrin. A summary is sufficient for present
purposes. Under Unitrin, a defensive tactic, including declining to redeem a poison pill, survives review

Acquisitions 801-895 (2d Ed. 1995), and 1999 Supplement 72-97.
8City

Capital Associates v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del.Ch. 1988). Whether Chancellor Allen subsequently
limited Interco to circumstances where the target company actively sought to provide shareholders an alternative
transaction favored by management is raised by his opinion in TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp.,
Fed.Sec.L.Rep. ¶94,334 (CCH)(Del.Ch. 1989).
9571

A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).

10"Plaintiff's

position [that the threat of an under-priced but non-coercive offer was not sufficient to block
shareholders from having the opportunity to decide whether to accept it] represents a fundamental misconception of our
standard of review principally because it would involve the court in substituting its judgment for what is a "better" deal
for that of a corporation 's board of directors. To the extent that the Court of Chancery has recently done so in several of
its opinions, we hereby reject such approach as not in keeping with a proper Unocal analysis. See, e.g., InterCo and its
progeny...." 571 A.2d at __. It is unclear whether Time's misreading of Interco, which was about the allocation of
decision authority between the board and shareholders not the board and the court, was deliberate or merely confused.

4

under Unocal if it is neither preclusive nor coercive and falls within a "range of reasonableness."10
According to the court, the critical issue is whether the defensive tactic is preclusive. But the first
question is preclusive of what? An unredeemed poison pill will always preclude a tender offer. It will
not, however, preclude the bidder from initiating a proxy fight to replace the target's directors with
nominees who are more likely to conclude, after careful and informed deliberation, that the offer is in the
shareholders' best interests and thereafter redeem the pill. Does the presence of a poison pill force a
bidder to have the success of its offer determined by an election rather than a tender offer?
Without confronting the issue directly, the Delaware Supreme Court appears to have assumed
that the availability of a proxy fight renders the poison pill non-preclusive, thereby shifting attention to
the circumstances under which the proxy fight could be conducted. The court acknowledges that
"[w]ithout the approval of target boards, the danger of activating a poison pill renders it irrational for a
bidder to pursue stock acquisitions above the triggering level."11 Thus, a poison pill is preclusive of a
tender offer. But under Unitrin, it appears that the refusal to redeem the pill is not preclusive under
Unocal unless a proxy fight is also precluded. On remand, the Supreme Court directed the Chancery
Court to "determine whether Unitrin's Repurchase Program would only inhibit American General's
ability to wage a proxy fight and institute a merger or whether it was, in fact, preclusive because
American General's success would either be mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable."12
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court in Unitrin at least identifies the circumstance when Unocal
allows a target to block a tender offer by declining to redeem a poison pill: if victory in a proxy fight
would be neither "mathematically impossible" nor "realistically unattainable." Because the poison pill
now is ubiquitous, every public company either has a pill or can adopt one on short notice if a hostile

111651

A.2d at 1388.

12Id.

At 1381.

13Id.

At 1388-89.
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offer is made, the court's analysis reduces functionally to a preference that control changes be resolved
through an election rather than through a market: targets can block tender offers so long as a stymied
bidder can press its case through a proxy fight.
We will not pause here to criticize the court's confused doctrinal analysis,13 but rather focus
instead on the wisdom of the court's conclusion. Are proxy contests preferable to tender offers as a
means of resolving a control challenge? Before attempting to answer this question, however, two
process-oriented criticisms are appropriate concerning the absence of transparency in the Unitrin
opinion.
First, an outcome as significant as privileging elections over markets should at least come with
an explanation. Providing a reason for an outcome at least imposes the discipline of logic on the range
of alternatives available to the court. Perhaps more important, an explanation provides in equal measure
not only a justification of the past but also guidance for the future. Ambiguity in its opinions may
provide a court flexibility, as some commentators have suggested in defense of past Delaware Supreme
Court opinions, but that flexibility comes at the expense of giving parties the information they need to
order their affairs without excessive uncertainty.
The second process-oriented criticism of the Unitrin court's privileging of elections over markets
is the impact of this preference on the integrity of the election process itself. The predictable result of
Unitrin has been a quickly escalating level of director-implemented barriers to contested elections. The
portion of the Chancery Court's opinion in Mentor Graphics Corporation v. Quickturn Design
Systems14 that concerned a defensively adopted bylaw illustrates the problem. The bylaw provided that,
upon a shareholder request for a special meeting, the board could delay holding the meeting for 90 to

14For example, even if the availability of a proxy contest was relevant to whether a pill must be redeemed, prior
doctrine suggested that a higher standard should be applied to target efforts to defend against a proxy fight than that the
defensive tactic has rendered victory in a proxy fight mathematically or realistically unattainable. See Blasius Industries v.
Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del.Ch. 1988).

15728

A.2d 25 (1998).

6

100 days after it determined the validity of the initial request. The Vice-Chancellor concluded that "the
90 to 100 day interval chosen by the Quickturn board, although it may arguably approach the outer limit
of reasonableness, struck a proper balance in this specific case."15 It is not unfair to the ViceChancellor to note that there is no real discussion of why 90 days is necessary. And it is certainly to the
Vice-Chancellor's credit that he was well aware of the risk that, without an animating principle that might
serve to cabin the opinion's predictable expansive drift, approving a 90 to 100 day delay would
encourage ever more extreme measures. After all, the worst that could happen to a target company is
that it would lose.
The Vice-Chancellor therefore explicitly warns that "attorneys who represent corporate boards
would best serve their clients well by counseling caution and restraint in this area, rather than seeking
continually to push the time-delay envelope outwards to test its fiduciary duty limits."16 But the
laudable impulse to lecture counsel on their duties cannot substitute for the lack of a guiding legal
principle. As an illustration, what factors would counsel against a delay of 90 days, said by the court to
be potentially unreasonable "in other circumstances"? If, as the court suggests, "it is impossible to draw
a line that categorically separates mandatory delay periods which have a basis in reason, from those that
so manifestly burden or impede the election process that they can be characterized as intended to
entrench the incumbent board," then how can this ambiguity do other than encourage clients
"continually to push the time-delay envelope outwards?"17 The absence of an explanation for the
Delaware Supreme Court's preference for elections over markets as a mechanism to mediate transfers of
control thus invites a repetition of the pattern by which limits on defensive conduct degraded under
16Id.

At 41-42.

17Id.

At 43, n. 70.

18Id.

This formulation can be read to require business judgment-like protection to the directors' choice of a delay
period, but since the bylaw is plainly intended to slow down a hostile offer, the standard should rise to intermediate
review. Indeed, because the bylaw restricts access to the election process, the standard of review plausibly should rise
further to a Blasius level.

7

unremitting client pressure."18 Shifting hostile tender offers into an election context similarly invites a
degrading of elections.
2. Normative Principles for Assessing The Comparative Desirability of Markets and
Elections as Mechanisms for Transferring Corporate Control
We ask whether, as a general rule, it is preferable for shareholders to decide whether to sell the
corporation through the mechanism of a tender offer ("transfer by sale") or through the mechanism of a
fair election -- a proxy contest free from managerial influence in which the issue involves replacing the
target board with the bidder's candidates, who will be more inclined to sell ("transfer by vote")? The
normative criterion we use to answer this question is efficiency, defined in this way: a transfer is
efficient if a target's assets will have a higher net expected value when managed by the acquirer than by
the target. Thus, for example, transfer by vote would be more efficient than transfer by sale if assets
would more frequently move to higher valued users when approval is effected through a vote, or if a
value increasing transaction would be approved by either method, but an election would involve lower
transaction costs.
This definition of efficiency excludes the preferences of other constituencies who may be
affected by a transaction. We exclude these preferences for two reasons. First, the Delaware Supreme
Court held, in connection with the sale of the company, that a board may take into account the interests
of other constituencies "provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders."19
The legal touchstone therefore is shareholder value; directors cannot reject a valuable transaction just
because it would impose costs on third parties. Second, these parties can attempt to implement their
preferences in both tender offer and proxy contexts. There now is no well developed reason to believe
that one of these vehicles would be more receptive to their concerns than the other. Then, applying the

19Id. The downward spiral concerning defensive tactics is traced in Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman,
"Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is there Substance to Proportionality Review?," 44 Bus. Law 247
(1989).

20Revlon

Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, ___ (Del. 1986).

8

law of least reason, we assume that the two vehicles are equally open to third party influence and focus
on monetary values.
The efficiency criterion used here implies that advocates of transfer by voting should be
assigned the burden of proof in evaluating competing transfer mechanisms for three reasons. First, it
apparently is cheaper to run a tender offer. In the current institutional environment, a potential acquirer
is compelled to win a proxy contest and then the acquisition. This typically will be more costly than
transferring control through a sale alone.20 Second, a tender offer seemingly operates more quickly
than a proxy contest.21 Third, as Part 1 argued, target managers have an incentive and the opportunity to
pervert an election process. Sales are harder to subvert. Taken together, these three reasons imply that
transfer by sale is preferable to transfer by vote unless transfer by vote results in assets moving to
higher valuing users sufficiently more frequently to offset the higher transaction and process costs
associated with elections.
The comparative efficiency of transfer by sale and transfer by vote ultimately is an empirical
matter. Theory, we argue below, implies that the burden of proof currently is not met: transfer by vote
appears, if anything, to be a less efficient mode than transfer by sale. In addition, the empirical evidence
shows that, when the issue in the proxy contest is an acquisition, contests that succeed increase target

21Bebchuk and Hart assume that tender offers are more expensive than proxy contests because a bidder must get
financing to acquire a controlling block while a proxy fight just involves a change in the board "without a massive
rearrangement of ownership." In their model, however, there are no legal barriers to making a takeover bid, so a "rival"
can freely compete with the target's management to manage the target's assets. The rival prevails either by making a
successful tender offer or by winning the proxy contest. Thus, they contemplate one procedure rather than two. We also
are concerned that focusing on one procedure in the way they do may be inappropriate because different control
mechanisms respond to different problems within the target corporation. See Andre Shliefer and Robert Vishney,
"Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control," 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 842 (1989).

22Our

assumptions about cost and delay are plausible but not beyond question. If less extensive defensive tactics
are allowed in response to a proxy contest, then a tender offer may be more expensive. Similarly, a tender offer may be
slower if a target can delay redeeming a poison pill in order to find a more valuable alternative, but the potential acquirer
can undertake an immediate consent solicitation to replace the target board of directors.

9

firm value while contests that fail reduce it.22 With the theoretical and empirical record in this state, we
will conclude that the Delaware Supreme Court is taking development of its Unocal doctrine in the
wrong direction. Preclusion of a tender offer alone should be sufficient to fail Unocal's intermediate
standard; the availability of a transfer by vote, let alone one where target management can impede that
vote so long as an acquirer's success is not rendered "mathematically impossible" or "realistically
unattainable," is an inferior substitute.
3. Transfer of Control by Vote: the Full Information Case
3.1 The Model
We begin by assuming that a proxy contest to elect directors who will allow a tender offer to
proceed by removing a poison pill illustrates informed voting: target shareholders, that is, are able to
make an informed choice in the proxy contest because they can evaluate the economic variables bearing
on the desirability of the underlying tender offer. This assumption has some plausibility. Most of what
the shareholders need to know is incorporated in the price offered by the bidder. For convenience (and
without loss of descriptive accuracy), we will refer to shareholders confronting such a proxy fight as
voting for or against the acquisition. Under our assumptions,23 we first argue that, with positive
probability, the election will reflect the preferences of the minority when minority voters have the greater
intensity of preference. We then argue that a minority composed of target management and its
associates may have sufficient intensity of preference to defeat an efficient takeover because the manager
group likely will have a large, private stake in the outcome.24
23See J. Harold Mulherin and Annette B. Poulsen, "Proxy Contests and Corporate Change: Implications for
Shareholder Wealth," 47 J. Financial Economics 279 (1998).

24We

also assume throughout that there are many voters, again a descriptively accurate assumption in connection
with corporate control contests; and for simplicity that each shareholder has one vote (i.e., owns one share). The one
share-one vote assumption will turn out not to be innocuous in the imperfect information case analyzed in Part 4 below.
25 An acquirer also may be interested in private benefits, in which event the proxy contest may involve the

spoils of control. We assume that this is not the typical case for two reasons. First, the context in our model is the
attempt to conclude an acquisition. A successful acquirer will own much of the target and therefore will internalize much

10

A shareholder in the transfer by vote game we consider25 understands that she is voting for the
insurgents and thus for the acquisition (outcome A) or for the incumbents and thus for no acquisition
(outcome N). The insurgents win if a majority of votes are cast for A (ties are resolved randomly so that
each outcome wins a tie with probability .5). Let c be the cost of voting, which is defined to include
evaluating alternatives, developing a strategy and casting a ballot.26 A shareholder gets a payoff θ
from the result of the proxy contest that is a function of (a) the
monetary gain or loss that derives solely from holding target stock;
and (b) the positive or negative private benefit, if any, that a
target shareholder would experience as a result of the proxy
contest's outcome (which may depend on the impact of the outcome on
of the agency cost associated with management status. In this vein, a recent paper argues: "A controlling party with a
larger stake internalizes more of the inefficiency of extracting private benefits, and thus extracts fewer of these gains.
Hence, the means of transferring control is important: Firm value is higher following a tender offer than after a negotiated
block trade." Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb and Fausto Panunzi, "Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of
Corporate control," 55 J. Finance 647, 649 (2000). Consequently, it is plausible to assume that while decisionmakers for
the target often wish to protect private benefits, the typical acquirer wants to maximize expected profits. Second, the
political economy of the issue suggests that managers of potential targets are protecting more than shareholder value. Our
analysis is symmetric as a formal matter, however. That is, if the acquiring group has more private benefits at stake, they
could win an election that our efficiency criterion directs should be lost. For the reasons in this note, we focus on the
opposite possibility. Private benefits play a larger role in the Bebchuk and Hart Yilmaz analyses, but in their models a
rival competes to manage a company through a proxy contest alone; such a rival may end up owning a small enough
share of the target to make realizing private benefits a plausible motive for playing the game.
26 The analysis follows Colin M. Campbell, "Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities," 107 J. Pol. Econ.
1199 (1999). For convenience, we assume that there is only one potential acquirer. If this acquirer could make a bid
directly to shareholders, would buy all tendered shares and would freeze out dissenters if the bid succeeded, then the target
shareholders would not be in a strategic situation. For them, tendering would be a weakly dominant strategy. This is
another reason (see also note 4, supra) for distinguishing the takeover context from the proxy context; in any Nash
equilibrium of the proxy contest game, we will see, target shareholders must play strategically (a shareholder's action, that
is, will partly be a function of the other shareholders' actions).
27Shareholders

also incur costs in tender offers. We assume that the costs to a shareholder of participating in a
proxy contest are higher than the costs of participating in a tender offer for two reasons. First, there is more for the
shareholder to consider in a proxy contest. In a tender offer, the shareholder must only evaluate the offer. Matters are
more complex in a proxy contest because under the law the winning slate cannot simply accept the bidder's offer; rather,
the new board must make an independent determination of what should be done next, the outcome of which determination
the shareholder must predict. See text at note 37, infra. Second, the shareholder may have to participate in two
procedures, a vote and then a possible tender offer, rather than one.
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the assets or subjective utility of the shareholder, as with target
managers, or on its impact on the value of other shares in the
stockholder's portfolio, as with contemporaneous institutional
holdings of bidder stock).
We define a shareholder voter's utility from an election as
u(A, θi) - u(N, θi) = θi
Here θi is a voter's type, defined as her marginal payoff when the
acquisition wins rather than loses.
a voter prefers N to A.

Note that θi will be negative is

A shareholder will have a strong preference

for an outcome (θi will be large for that voter) when her relative
payoffs for the two outcomes differ widely.

This way of

conceptualizing shareholder preferences implies that some
shareholders will not vote: for a nonvoting shareholder, the marginal
gain from her preferred outcome would be less than voting costs, even
when the shareholder's vote would be determinative.
An equilibrium of this voting game can be summarized by two
numbers, α and ß, that characterize the payoffs of those who vote.
To be precise, α is drawn from the set of negative payoffs that would
result from the acquisition sufficiently large as to exceed voting
costs for a shareholder who would get a payoff in that set.

Hence,

an α shareholder would vote against the acquisition if the likelihood
were sufficiently great that her vote would matter.

Similarly, ß is

drawn from the set of positive payoffs that would result from the
acquisition sufficiently large as to exceed voting costs for a

12

shareholder who would get a payoff in that set.

Shareholders whose

payoffs are not at least as great as those in α or ß abstain.

Hence,

the strategy profile in this election game -- the rule the players
follow -- requires all θ types that are less than α to vote against
the acquisition (i.e., vote for target management) in the proper
circumstances, and all θ types that are greater than ß to vote for the
acquisition (i.e., support the insurgent slate).
3.2 Results
A minority of voters could prevail in an election defined in
this manner and the outcome of such a vote could be inefficient.
argument for these conclusions is in two steps.27

The

First, the

alternative whose marginal voter has a greater stake in the outcome
is likely to win the election.

Second, the marginal voter with the

greater stake will be in the minority if the probability that a
minority voter is more zealous (as we will define the term) is higher
than the probability that a majority voter is more zealous.
Regarding step one, realize that N(A) is more likely to win
(lose) if the probability that a voter prefers N is greater than the
probability that a voter prefers A.28

In any equilibrium, let α* and

ß* be the equilibrium marginal voters, those whose payoffs are just
negative or positive enough to cause them to vote.

28The

If the number of

results and intuition are set forth, not the proofs.

29Mathematically (recalling that the marginal payoff to a voter who prefers N is defined to be negative, and the
marginal payoff to a voter who prefers A is defined to be positive), the requirement is that F(α ) is greater than
(less than) 1-F(ß).
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votes for N is likely to exceed the number of votes for A, then a
shareholder who is considering voting for A has a greater incentive
to vote than someone with an equally strong preference for N.

This

is because it is more likely that A will get one fewer vote than N.
Therefore, the A voter does not need as large a stake in the outcome
as the N voter (with preferences measured by θ) to participate: the A
shareholder's vote is more likely to be needed.

As a consequence,

the marginal shareholder voter is more likely to prefer N to A if and
only if the marginal N voter would have a higher negative payoff from
A than the marginal A voter would have a positive payoff (i.e.,
¿>ß*).

¿α*

This condition implies that F( )>(I-F(ß)), which is to say

that the alternative whose marginal voter has a greater stake in the
outcome is more likely to win.
Regarding the second step, let π be the proportion of voters
that prefers N.

Then, regardless of how small π is, N could be the

winning outcome if N voters are more zealous than A voters.

To see

what is meant by zealous, let there be a number x(π) such that only
shareholders of type θ > x(π) will vote, and such that θ > x(π)
together with the appropriate distributions among those who prefer N
and A imply that

F1 (- )>(1- )(1- F2( )), where F1 is the

distribution of types among shareholders who prefer N and F2 is the
distribution of types among shareholders who prefer A.

This

condition states that regardless of how many shareholders prefer A,
there is a threshold stake in the outcome such that the probability
that a voter prefers N and has a stake in excess of the threshold is
14

greater than the probability that a voter prefers A and has a stake
that exceeds the threshold, that is, there are more zealous N voters
than A voters.29

The first step together with the satisfaction of

this condition implies that N wins in equilibrium with probability
greater than one-half when the number of voters gets large.
For a formal sketch of the logic, it can be established that
when a sufficiently large number of voters exists, no type θ
ε{0,x(π)},

the "mild" A preferrers, can vote in any equilibrium.

This is because the likelihood that an A voter would be pivotal is so
low that the expected value of her vote would be less than the costs.
Thus, in any equilibrium (α*, ß*), it must be that ß*> x(π): those
who vote for A have large stakes in the outcome.

When the condition

stated in the paragraph above is satisfied, however, -α* > ß*, which
implies by the first step in the argument that F(α*) > 1 - F(ß*): the
probability that the marginal voter prefers N in equilibrium is
greater than the probability that the marginal voter prefers A.
Hence N is more likely to win than A.
As for the intuition, realize first that, under the majority
voting rule considered here, a shareholder's vote will not matter if,
when there are n total voters, n/2 + 1 will vote for N or n/2 - 2
will vote for N: in either case, the illustrative shareholder's vote
cannot affect the outcome.

Hence, the shareholder, in deciding what

30This

condition is implied, as an illustration, by the stronger conditions that there are types preferring N who
exist with positive probability and whose intensities are unmatched by types preferring A; or, if the distributions of types
are continuously differentiable, that while the most extreme A and N voters have identical intensities of preference, the
probability that an A voter would be at the extreme is less than the probability that an N voter would be at the extreme.
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to do, will ignore these cases and concentrate on the possible states
of the world in which her vote counts -- when she is the pivotal
voter.

These states occur either when there are an exactly even

number of votes for N and A, or N will get one less vote than A.

The

zealous shareholders are those with the most at stake and we now
assume that the key condition is satisfied: more zealous shareholders
prefer N to A.

It follows that when the number of shareholders

becomes large, the likelihood that the vote of a shareholder who
prefers A will be pivotal becomes extremely small at the margin:
there will be too few A voters (as opposed to A preferrers) for this
to happen with a substantial probability.

An A preferring

shareholder who perceives the probabilities correctly thus herself
will not vote unless her payoff from an acquisition is large.

In

sum, as the threshold stakes increase, only voters with large stakes
will be voting, and the alternative preferred by more of these
zealous voters will have the advantage.
Before applying this result directly to proxy contests in
connection with acquisitions, there are two general points to make.
First, the voting game will lead to an efficient outcome even when
the minority win if the intensity of preference of the minority is
sufficiently greater than the intensity of preference of the
majority.

This would mean here that it would be efficient for N to

win if the sum of all shareholder types (their θs) is negative.
Recall that π is the expected proportion of voters who prefer N.

The

expected value of the outcome for a voter who prefers N thus is -θπ,
and the expected value of the outcome for the voter who prefers A is
16

θ(1 - π).

If π is small, the expected value of the outcome for the

typical N preferrer can be lower than the expected value of the
outcome for the A preferrer.30

When the electorate is large and π is

small, the probability thus is very low that the sum of all voters' θs
is negative.

Therefore, when a large majority prefers an outcome but

the minority has more zealous voters and defeats the outcome for this
reason, the result often will be inefficient.
Second, this welfare analysis assumes that the preferences and
costs of voting are linked.

To see why this matters, assume that

preferences and participation costs are drawn from different
distributions.

This implies that as the relevant voter population

becomes large, only persons with low voting costs will participate.
Given the assumption that costs and preferences are independent, the
preferences of these voters will be representative of the preferences
of the population at large.31

Hence, the election outcome will

implement the preferences of a majority of voters, though only a
minority vote.

Just when preferences and voting costs are linked

rather than independent in real elections is an empirical question,
but we will argue below that this link exists for proxy contests in
connection with takeovers.
3.3 An Application to Acquisitions
This model permits a zealous shareholder group to block an

31We

can represent this outcome mathematically as πE[-θ

32See

John O. Ledyard, "The Pure Theory of Large Two-Candidate Elections," 44 Public Choice 7 (1984).
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¿ θ<0]<(1 - π)E[θ ¿ θ>0].

efficient acquisition or to compel an inefficient one.

We focus on

the former problem because, for the reasons given above (acquiring
companies internalize agency costs; markets are semistrong
efficient), it seems the more typical case.
partition shareholders into two groups.

Turning to the analysis,

The first group, called

"management shareholders," is composed of members of current
management and individuals and entities who would do better if the
takeover is defeated, such as unions, and perhaps suppliers and
customers.

These shareholders receive a private benefit from holding

their target shares under current target management.

The second

group, called "independent shareholders," benefits from their shares
only as shareholders; they receive no private benefits.

Our focus on

the prevention of efficient acquisitions thus implies that a
potential acquirer votes its shares as if it were an independent
shareholder.
Because of private benefits, the marginal management shareholder
often will have a higher payoff from defeating a takeover than the
marginal independent shareholder will have from the takeover being
approved, and the management shareholder often will have lower voting
costs.

To understand these claims, suppose initially that if the

bidder's nominees win the proxy contest, the company will be sold for
at least p.

Let a shareholder's opportunity cost in selling a share

now be x, and the loss of private benefits to a management group
shareholder if A wins be b per share.

An independent shareholder

will vote for A if the gain from sale, gs, equal to price less
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opportunity cost, is greater than zero, or gs = p-

x > 0.

The

management group shareholder will vote for A if the gain to it from
sale, gm, equal to price less opportunity cost less private benefits,
is greater than zero, or
gm = p-

x-

b > 0.

If gm < 0, then b > p - x.

As a result, the

management group shareholder would have a higher negative payoff than
the independent shareholder would have a positive payoff when
b - (p,

x) > p-

x, or when b > 2(p - x).

Intuitively, the management group shareholder's loss per share
in private benefits is partly offset by the gain from tendering her
stock.

Thus, this shareholder's negative payoff from an

acquisition's success will exceed the independent shareholder's
positive payoff only if the private benefits loss is large, formally,
more than twice the financial gain on the sale of a share.

This

condition will be satisfied when the management group holds
relatively few shares and would incur a large private benefit loss.
In this circumstance, the marginal management voter will be more
zealous than the marginal independent voter.

And as shown above,

when the probability that a voter prefers N is low (there are
relatively few management shares) but such a voter has much at stake,
an N outcome, defeating the insurgent slate and thereby blocking the
tender offer, likely would have poor welfare properties.32

33This

analysis is complicated when we add a third category of voters, institutional investors who because of
their portfolios (holding both the bidder and the target) or because of their reputations also have private benefits associated
with the outcome of the proxy contest. Because the private benefits of this group can depend on either the takeover going
forward because it increases the group's reputation as portfolio managers, or on it failing because the takeover reduces the
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Turning to costs, a management group shareholder commonly also
will have lower voting costs than an independent shareholder because
preferences and voting costs in proxy contests are not independent.
The private benefits that the management group seeks to preserve
result from their status, which also gives them lower cost access to
the means to evaluate alternatives and form a strategy than will be
available to independent shareholders.33

Hence, a shareholder voter's

preferences and costs are not drawn from independent distributions.
The analysis to this point favors control changes through a
market mechanism rather than an electoral mechanism.34

Where some

target voters have a greater intensity of preference than acquirer
voters and voting is costly, a proxy contest can fail even if a
majority of the electorate wanted the challenge to succeed, and if
the sale that would have followed the vote would have been efficient.
The evidence is consistent with this conclusion.

In Mulherin and

Poulsen's study of proxy contests involving acquisitions, the 63

value of the bidder by more than the premium paid to the target, their position is not as predictable as the management
group shareholders. Thus, institutional investors may serve as a partial offset to either the zealous management
shareholder who votes against the insurgents, or to zealous bidder related target shareholders who ignore the impact of the
transaction on the value of the bidder's shares.
34Institutional shareholders provide an intermediate case with respect to costs, with their status also reducing
their voting costs because they possess expertise in evaluating acquisitions generally and also because they know their
own portfolios.

35Our

conclusion may partly be affected by the presence of arbitragers. These players may have private benefits
(perhaps the greater gains possible from a highly leveraged portfolio) that balance those of the management group, are
likely to have lower costs of voting than the typical independent shareholder, and are therefore more likely to vote than the
independent shareholders from whom they bought the shares. The role that arbitragers play in a voting model such as
ours is not fully understood, but we note that if arbitragers in fact are more likely to vote, then target managers will be
less likely to prevail (because arbitragers commonly want bids to succeed). Then if market are semi-strong efficient and
acquirers maximize expected profits, arbitragers would push proxy contests toward efficiency.
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firms that were acquired had a cumulative average return of 12.4% in
the year following the contest while the 53 firms that were not
acquired had a cumulative average return of minus 23.5%.

If

successful acquirers do not lose money on average, this evidence
suggests that partisan target managers are defeating proxy challenges
more frequently than efficiency argues they should.35
4.

Voting Under Uncertainty
The model above assumed: (i) Each target shareholder owned one

share, and thus had one vote; (ii) The number of voters was large;
(iii) Voting was costly; (iv) For some voters, private benefits were
at stake in the proxy election; (v) Shareholders knew the
distribution from which shareholder preferences were drawn (which
permitted them to calculate the probability that they were pivotal);
(vi) Shareholder voters were fully informed about the relevant
variables.

In this Part, we initially drop assumptions (iii) and

(iv), for convenience, and (vi), for possible realism.
Regarding(vi), uncertainty could exist respecting a proxy contest
because a new board has a fiduciary duty to represent all of the
shareholders, not just the acquirer that financed the contest.36

The

36This study uses aggregate rather than firm level data. We speculate that inefficiency is more likely to occur
when institutional investors, especially professional managers, hold a relatively small number of shares, and where voting
costs (which recall include evaluation costs) are relatively high. This describes smaller public corporations that have
fewer institutional holders and a small analyst following. Many of the recently public dot.coms are a good example.

37The Delaware Supreme Court has noted that after such an election the bidder's "newly elected directors will be

required to discharge their unremitting loyalty to manage the corporation for the benefit of Quickturn and its
stockholders." Thus, the new directors would have to make an informed judgment, presumably subject to review under
Revlon's intermediate standard if the transaction otherwise meets the change in control test, that the proposed transaction
represents the best alternative available to the company. See AMP Incorporated v. Allied Signal, Inc., 1998 WL 77348
(E.D. Pa.).
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new Board thus could decide, after making the requisite independent
determination, not to sell the target because it would be more
valuable under their management than under the old board, to sell the
target to someone other than the initial acquirer, or to use a sale
mode, a silent auction, say, that encourages entry by other bidders.
As a consequence, there can be more uncertainty in connection with a
proxy contest than with a tender offer, where an affirmative action
helps to produce a determinate payoff, the shareholder gets the bid
price if the offer succeeds.
We initially show that, on the assumptions we now make, a proxy
election will aggregate information efficiently.

This means that the

election will choose the outcome that would have been chosen had all
private information been revealed to all of the voters before the
vote occurred.

Informational efficiency occurs because voters in

large elections can invert back solely from possible voting results
to the payoff relevant variables.

The assumptions that each voter

holds one share and that no voters receive private benefits are
unrealistic, however. When they are relaxed, we will see, shareholder
voters no longer will know the distribution from which shareholder
preferences are drawn or the number of shareholders who have observed
particular signals of the true state of the world. And when the
voters lack this knowledge, full informational equivalence is
unlikely to obtain: that is, shareholders will with a nontrivial
probability fail to choose the outcome that would have been chosen in
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a full information world.37

The analysis in this Part is technical.

Readers who believe that an institution that performs badly when the
information structure is favorable is unlikely to perform well when
the informational structure is unfavorable can go directly to Part 5,
which sketches the policy implications of the analysis.
4.1 The model
To pursue the implications of uncertainty, we again assume that
the election requires shareholder voters to choose between the
outcomes A or N.

A shareholder's utility depends on his preferences

over these outcomes (shareholder preferences can differ), and on the
true state of the world (in some states of the world, an acquisition
is best for a shareholder given his preferences; in others, the
target remaining independent is best).

Utility is indexed as before

by θ; states of the world are indexed by s ε [0, 1] (s lies between 0
and one).

Similar to the above, we can write
v(s, θ) = u(A,s,θ) - u(N,s,θ)

which is the utility difference of a voter of type θ between
alternative A and alternative N in state s.
It is assumed that this difference is continuous, and is strictly
increasing in θ (higher types prefer A more) and in s ("higher" states
38What follows is drawn primarily from Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pessendorfer, "Voting Behavior and

Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," 65 Econometrica 1029 (1997). Also helpful are same
authors, "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting," 92 Amer. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 23 (1998); Peter J. Coughlan, "In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and
Strategic Voting," 94 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 375 (2000); and David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks, "Information
Aggregation, Rationality and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," 90 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 34 (1996). Some experimental
confirmation of this genre of model is found in Serena Guarnaschelli, Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey, "An
Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules," 94 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 407 (2000). All of these papers are complex
mathematically. The text above attempts to present the intuition.
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of the world are more favorable for A).

Each shareholder knows his

own type but not the types of other shareholders.

Regarding timing, the game begins when the potential acquirer
and target management distribute proxy proposals.

At this stage,

each shareholder has a prior probability over possible future states.
The shareholder next receives a signal σ that correlates with the
true state.

These signals have a public element (e.g., the

information in proxy proposals and the acquirer and target's public
communications), and a private element (e.g., what a particular
shareholder learns about the relevant business environment).

The

private element of the signal that shareholder i receives is
independent of the private element of the signal that shareholder j
receives.

A shareholder's strategy in this game has two elements: to

vote for A or to vote for N; and to use the information in his signal
when voting or to discard this information.

Shareholders vote after

choosing a strategy and receiving signals.
We let A win if (n + 1)q voters choose A, where 0 < q <= 1 and q
is fixed in advance.38

Preferences thus would be aggregated under

majority rule if q = n, but the analysis permits super or sub
majority voting rules as well.

A shareholder voter can influence the

outcome only when nq voters will vote for A, and he will then,
conditional on his vote being pivotal, choose A if that has the
higher expected payoff.

In any equilibrium of this voting game, some

39In

large elections, the probability of a tie is very small so the analysis from now on omits a rule to resolve
ties. Note also that since voting here is assumed to be costless, all shareholders in the model will vote.
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voters will ignore their signals to vote for A (N).

These voters

have sufficiently strong priors over what they think the true state
is, or have sufficiently strong preferences for one of the outcomes,
so that the expected value to these voters of an A (N) vote
conditional on being pivotal cannot be changed by the signal they
receive.

As a consequence, only a subset of voters can vote

informatively (vote on the basis of their signals).39

4.2 Full Informational Equivalence
Full informational equivalence occurs, on the assumptions above,
because voters in large elections can infer what the true state of
the world is by "inverting back" to that state from the distribution
of voter preferences and the voting rule.

To begin to see how, it is

helpful to begin with two definitions: (a) The probability that a
randomly selected voter votes for N in state s is t(s,δ) where δ is
the equilibrium strategy profile; (b) The probability that a voter
would observe the signal σ when the true state of the world in s is
p(σ | s).

When the electorate is large, voter beliefs about t(s,δ),

conditional on the voter being pivotal, will be concentrated around
q, the portion of votes required for N to prevail.
pivotal when nq other voters would vote for N.

A voter will be

Since the voter's

preferences partly are a function of the true state of the world, the
voter will attempt to infer that state; and he will do this by asking

40Voting

on the basis of one's signal is called informative because when voters act in this way, one can infer a
voter's private information from his vote.
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what signals regarding the true state of the world must the other
shareholders have observed in order for the illustrative shareholder
to be pivotal.

Suppose that many voters were observing signals such

that, for those voters, p(σ | s) > q.

Since t(s,δ) must lie between

zero and one, and since a voter's preferences are nonincreasing in s,
that so many voters were observing signals that s likely is "high" is
inconsistent with the fact that nq voters are voting for N; for when
s is that high, the randomly selected voter is likely to choose A
with probability greater than q.

Conversely, that many shareholders

were observing signals such that for them p(σ | s) < q would be
inconsistent with the fact that as many as nq shareholders were
voting for A; for when the probability that the state is low is
large, the randomly selected voter will choose N with probability
greater than q.

It must follow that if nq voters would vote for N,

the illustrative voter will think that the probability that a
randomly selected voter will vote for N in state s, t(s,δ), must lie
in the close neighborhood of q.

And this in turn implies that the

voter will infer that the likely true states of the world are those
that would cause a randomly selected voter to prefer N with
probability q.40

an illustration, suppose that n = 1,000 and q = n. A voter who is pivotal knows that 500 voters will
choose N. That this many voters prefer N is inconsistent with many more than half the voters observing signals
implying that A or N would be best. The illustrative voter thus will think that the true states of the world are those
generating signals that would induce a randomly selected voter to prefer N with probability approximating 2, which is q.
41As
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As a consequence of voters putting most of their probability
mass on a very few possible states, the "information generating
service" - the available facts and permissible inferences from
them - is unlikely to permit the shareholder to make fine
distinctions among these states.

Formally, let there be a subset of

possible states denoted S with the property that, conditional on a
vote being pivotal, the true state s is in S with probability one;
and the probability that the voter will receive a certain signal σ
given that the true state is s will be constant on the set S for all
signals σ.

When the signals are uninformative, the expected payoff

difference in voting for A or N, conditional on one's vote being
pivotal, will be independent of the signal a voter receives.

And

when the payoff difference is independent of the signal, the portion
of shareholders who vote for N on the basis of their prior
probability estimate and preferences alone, approach each other.
That is, almost no voter votes on the basis of the signal he
receives, votes informatively, when the electorate is large.
Strategic voting nevertheless will achieve full informational
equivalence.

This is because if the signal generating service is

accurate,41 then a voter can predict the actual state with great
accuracy, conditional on a vote being pivotal.

To begin to see why

these predictions are possible, the discussion to here is the basis
for a showing that the distribution over states in S conditional on a
vote being pivotal converges on a particular state, which can be
42To

be precise, the assumption is that the monotone likelihood ratio property holds: roughly, a voter is more
likely to observe a signal that the state s is high rather than low when the true state is high.
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denoted sn.

Convergence occurs because when the maximum difference

between any pair of states in S is small, which it is, then for a
large enough electorate the probability distribution over states must
be arbitrarily concentrated around one state.

Consequently, the

voters will line up such that, if q = n, then because the electorate
thinks that sn is the true state conditional on the median -- that is,
pivotal -- voter determining the outcome, very close to 50% will vote
against A (for them, A is bad in state sn) and very close to 50% will
vote for.

Because voters will line up in this way in large

elections, the concentration of shareholder beliefs on the single
state sn implies that large elections will be close with probability
approaching one in every state.

Put another way, the fraction of the

electorate that supports N will be very close to the critical
fraction q.
Turning to informational equivalence, let θ* be the expected
preference parameter of the median voter.

We have just seen that in

a large election, the actual preference parameter of the median
voter, called the "q-median", will be close to θ*; and in a large
election, the actual q-median's preferred alternative wins.
Therefore, full informational equivalence is achieved if the expected
preference parameter θ* wins with probability close to one.
To see why it will, realize that the alternative preferred by
the expected q-median voter depends on the state.
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Let s* be the

state in S that minimizes v(θ*,s).42

When v(θ*,s*) = 0, the expected

q-median voter is indifferent to the outcome.

If v(θ*,s*) > 0, there

is no state in which a voter of type θ* prefers N to A, and hence s*
is the state in which A should prevail.

Similarly, if v(θ*,s*) < 0,

then s* is the state in which N should prevail.

Therefore, there

will be full informational equivalence if A is almost certainly the
winner when the actual state s > s*, and N wins otherwise.
Now consider a state in which v(θ*,s*) = 0 so the q-median voter
is indifferent to the outcome.

Recall that, conditional on a vote

being pivotal, the distribution over states puts almost all of the
weight on one state, sn, so that voters behave as if state sn has
occurred.

In the limit (when n becomes large) sn = s*.

To see why,

realize that if v(θ*, sn) > ε > 0, the fraction of voters who prefer N
in state sn is smaller than and bounded away from q.

But then the

fraction of voters who vote for N in sn also is smaller than and
bounded away from q, and this contradicts that result that large
elections are close, that actual vote shares are close to expected
vote shares with high probability.

Further, an election can be close

only if voters believe that the state is very close to s* (in which
state the median-q voter is close to indifferent).

Since the vote

share of alternative N is defined to be strictly decreasing in the

43Recall

that v(θ, s) is the utility difference between A winning and N winning
for a voter of type θ in state s. Hence, the smaller v(θ,s) is the closer to
indifference the voter is.

29

state s, a tie could occur only if for a state s < s* - ε, N wins with
probability close to one and for a state s > s* + ε, A wins with a
probability close to one.

This is the condition for full

informational equivalence.

Hence, full informational equivalence

obtains when and because voters can invert back from the fact of
being pivotal to what the true state likely is.43
To summarize the model's logic, shareholders do not vote on the
basis of the information in the signals they receive.

In this case,

large elections will be close, thus implying that the outcome will be
decided by the votes of those taking informative action.

The pivotal

voter can infer the true outcome that would have been reached had
every voter known the information in all of the voters' signals.
4.3 The failure of full informational equivalence
A large election will satisfy full informational equivalence
when voters ignore their signals (that is, do not act on the basis of
their private information).

It is rational for voters to behave in

this way because a strategic voter can infer the true state with
great accuracy.

The voter can draw this inference first because each

voter knows the distribution from which voter preferences are drawn.

44To get a flavor of the actual proof, let the probability that a voter is indifferent between N and A be greater
than q for the highest possible state s. All voters whose preferences, their θs, are less than this
indifference preference will vote for N. In a large election, N will then be
chosen with probability close to one: more than q percent of the voters will
prefer N. This result will satisfy full informational equivalence because voters
with preferences below the indifference preference in the highest state would
prefer N in every lower state. Similarly, A will win if the probability that a
voter is indifferent between N and A in the lowest possible state s is less than
q. (The proof is complex when Fθ(θN) < q < Fθ(θA)). In a different model, Yilmaz
assumes that shareholders know the distribution from which voter preferences are
drawn and that no one in the relevant shareholder universe owns a block.
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Then, conditional on the voter being pivotal, the voter also knows
how many voters have observed signals that favor one result or the
other.

A strategic shareholder can use these data to observe signals

that favor one result or the other.

A strategic shareholder can use

these data to invert back to the true state of the world from his
status as the pivotal voter.

Full informational equivalence likely

fails in proxy contest elections in which a takeover is the ultimate
issue because shareholders lack the data required to draw the key
inference.

Specifically, voters may not know the distribution of

shareholder preferences and seldom will know, even conditional on
being pivotal, how many voters have observed which signals.
To see why uncertainty about the preference distribution defeats
the equivalence result just derived, let the distribution function
according to which nature selects the electorate depend on the
parameter ϒ ε [0,1], and be given by Hϒ (θ).

Because there now are

partisans, this distribution has mass at the values for θ that imply
partisanship: that is, there is a positive probability that some
voters will be partisans.

For convenience, the likelihood that there

are many N partisans is assumed to be falling in ϒ, and conversely.
The number of partisans for either alternative is assumed to be less
than the fraction of the electorate needed to elect that alternative.
In this version of the election game, nature first chooses the state
s and the parameter γ independently, and voters have priors over both
variables.

The realized state is (s, γ), and after it is chosen

nature picks an electorate by drawing from Hϒ (θ).
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There will e an

expected q-median voter given the realized γ.

Similar to the above,

s(γ) is the state in which this voter is indifferent to the outcome:
v(s(γ), θ(γ)) = 0.

Full informational equivalence is defined as

before using this concept of indifference.
Turning to information aggregation, suppose that for a
particular state (s, γ) the expected vote share of alternative N is q
(recall that large elections are close).

A shareholder, however, now

no longer can infer the actual state by reasoning that because he is
pivotal, he must put most of his probability weight on distributions
of the state s in which the expected vote share of N is q.

This is

because now the voter can be pivotal in more than one way.

Recall

that the vote share for N is a strictly decreasing function of γ
(because the expected number of N partisans falls as γ declines); and
the vote share for N also is a strictly decreasing function of state
s (for nonpartisans).

Consequently, the expected vote share for N

would be unchanged if s is decreased but γ is increased.

Conditional

on being pivotal, a shareholder voter thus will believe that one of
the states exists in which the expected vote share of N is q.

But

now there is an interval of states such that this could occur,
depending on the states and the number of partisans.

Therefore, the

voter no longer can use the chain of reasoning described above,
inferring back from vote counts to states of the world.

Put

mathematically, the voters' beliefs over states cannot converge to a
degenerate distribution, which puts almost all of the weight on one
state (sn in the initial analysis).
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In this event, even conditional

on being pivotal, a voter's private information, his signal, will
convey useful information about what the actual state is; hence, the
fraction of voters who vote on the basis of their signals no longer
goes to zero.
Full informational equivalence requires that for states in which
the pivotal voter is indifferent (vs(γ), γ), the expected vote share
for N must be close to q in a large election.
informatively, this condition is not met.

When voters vote

For a generic choice of

the preference parameter v, equilibrium strategies allow too few
degrees of freedom to have the expected vote share equal to q for all
states ((s(γ), γ)).

The problem is as said: there now are two random

variables, s and γ, both of which are correlated with the votes for
each alternative.

Thus, a voter no longer can reason back from his

status as being pivotal to the payoff relevant state variables.

And

given this inability, then close to the set of indifference states s(γ), γ -- the wrong alternative is chosen with high probability.
There will be uncertainty over the preference distribution in
connection with proxy votes for takeovers because the identity of the
management group often is uncertain.

Shareholders who comprise the

target's board are highly likely to vote against.

An important

supplier also would vote for N if there is no state of the world in
which it would do better were the target under new management, but
the supplier could prefer A if there is a chance that it would do
better after a major change.

The share prices of targets fall when

acquisitions are defeated unless another bidder likely is
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forthcoming.

Hence, arbitragers may or may not be partisan,

depending on their view of the corporate control market.

Suppliers,

customers, unions and arbitragers, that is, may or may not be
partisans.

This implies that for a non-partisan shareholder, the

other shareholder votes will be a function both of the state s and of
the distribution of voter types -- γ in the analysis above, where the
voter knows H

ϒ

(θ) but not nature's particular draw.

Therefore, in

many proxy contests shareholders could not invert from voting
positions to states of the world.
A second reason for the inability of a shareholder voter to
infer the true state of the world is that the number of people who
observe signals about the true state is strictly smaller than the
number of votes (because shareholders can hold blocks).

As a

consequence, the expected vote share for an alternative can equal the
required voting percentage to pass that alternative in more than one
way.

To understand why this matters, suppose that the expected vote

share for N equals q.

An individual shareholder and a block

shareholder both will consider only the state in which they are
pivotal in order to decide how to vote, but for each of them the
configuration of voters requisite to their being pivotal will differ.
As a simple example, assume that X = 100 shares, q = 2, five
shareholders hold blocks of ten, and fifty shareholders hold one
share each.

Then a nonpartisan individual shareholder can be pivotal

if (i) the five ten-vote blocks prefer A but no individuals do; (ii)
four ten-vote blocks and ten individuals prefer A; (iii) three ten-
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vote blocks and twenty individuals prefer A; (iv) two ten-vote blocks
and thirty individuals prefer A; (v) one ten-vote block and 40
individuals prefer A.

A nonpartisan block holder would be pivotal if

there are 41 votes for A, which could occur if (i) three other 10vote blocks and 11 individual shareholders will vote for A; (ii) two
other block shareholders prefer A and 21 individuals do; (iii) one
other 10-vote block prefers A and 31 individuals do; (iv) 41
individuals prefer A.

The individual shareholder and the block

holder thus would be attempting to infer the true state conditional
on the expected vote share being equal to 2, but they would be using
different voter configurations to perform this task.
To appreciate the difficulty this example exposes, when every
voter has one vote, a voter can infer, conditional on being pivotal,
the signals about the true state of the world that other voters have
observed.

An essential step in the argument for full informational

equivalence, recall, is that voter beliefs about which state exists
concentrate around a very small set of states -- those that could
produce a value for the probability that a random voter would support
N that approximates q.

When the number of votes is decoupled from

the number of voters, such an inference from the fact of being
pivotal to the true state of the world no longer is possible to draw.
In the example above, an individual shareholder would be pivotal if
5, 14, 23, 32 or 41 other shareholders had observed certain signals.
When as few as five or as many as 41 voters have observed signals
implying that the true state of the world is such that N is the best
choice, a shareholder voter lacks a reason, even conditional on being
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pivotal, to put probability mass on a very few possible future
states.

To use the notation above, there no longer exists a set of

states S in which voter signals will not distinguish among the
states.

Thus, proxy contest voters will vote on the basis of the

varying signals that they observe (i.e., shareholders will vote
informatively).

This will lead to the failure of full informational

equivalence: a proxy contest is unlikely to reach the result that
would have been reached had all information been revealed before the
vote.44

4.4 Summary
The analyses of proxy voting in Parts 3 and 4 assumed a
relatively ideal voting environment.

The entire target board was up

for election at the same time, and target management did nothing to
subvert the election process.

Voting performed badly nevertheless.

45In

this model, randomly bad results can occur: uninformed target shareholders sometimes will incorrectly say
yes and sometimes incorrectly say no. Bebchuk and Hart argue that imperfect information systematically biases proxy
contests against the rival. To see how they reach this conclusion, following them define the present value of the cash
flow that would be realized under the rival's management as YR and the present value of the cash flow under incumbent
management as YI . Then, YR - Y I = ∆ YR, which is drawn from the density function g(·| YI ) with support of (-Y I ,
infinity) and mean ∆YR*(YI ). Next make two assumptions: (i) Target shareholders know the distribution g( ·| -YI ) but
cannot observe particular realizations of ∆YR; (ii) Uninformed shareholders assume that the mean of the distribution
∆YR*(YI) is negative. The second assumption holds that rivals will lose money on average, and is made because
"[p]resumably there are many bad managers in the world who would be more than happy to run a public company and
capture some private benefits of control." When shareholders believe that rivals will lose money, they will vote no
regardless of the quality a rival may possess, and the market price will not inform them: the market maker, even if herself
informed, would set the price equal to P = YI because the incumbent always wins. The second assumption is inapplicable
to our context because acquirer/rivals are maximizing profits rather than private benefits (see note 25, supra). Target
shareholders are unlikely to assume that well financed bidders interested in making money will lose money on average.
Of significance, our analysis and theirs both conclude that proxy contests evaluate proposed changes in corporate control
poorly in imperfect information environments.
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When shareholder voters were assumed to be well informed, Part 3
showed how a proxy challenge could fail even if a majority of the
electorate wanted the challenge to succeed and the proposed merger
would have been efficient.

The forces driving that model were the

different intensities of preference of shareholder voters and costly
voting.

The model in Part 4 initially dropped the assumptions of

full information and costly voting and showed that, in these
circumstances, a proxy election with a large number of voters would
aggregate information efficiently.

When the assumptions that each

shareholder had one vote and no voters were partisan were relaxed,
however, then there will be inefficient information aggregation, even
when voting is costless.

The election could choose A when N would be

efficient (on the value maximization criterion set out above), or
could choose N when A would be efficient.

While the two models we

use reflect different ways of analyzing the question this paper
addresses, it is significant that they agree on the same conclusion:
transfer by voting has a good chance of reaching the wrong result.
Given that the burden of proof is appropriately assigned to the
transfer by vote mechanism (see Part 2, supra), this conclusion
strongly suggests that the Delaware Supreme Court's preference for
elections is misplaced.

Part 5 turns to an analysis of how that

preference is best changed.
5.

Returning to Doctrine and Policy: What Can be Done?
Our formal inquiry into the relative efficiency of sale and

voting as mechanisms for control changes was motivated by a real
problem.

In Unitrin, the Delaware supreme Court held that a refusal
37

to redeem a poison pill in the face of a hostile tender offer was not
preclusive and therefore did not violate Unocal's intermediate
standard when the offer's only threat, other than to management
strategy, was a too low price.

Although the poison pill prevented a

tender offer, so long as the bidder's prospects for dislodging a
majority of the board through a proxy fight were not "mathematically
impossible or realistically unattainable,"45 the bidder was relegated
to pursuing the transaction through the electoral process.

The

Unitrin holding thus permits a target to require that an election,
rather than the market, mediate a control contest.

Moreover, if we

are to take the "mathematically impossible or realistically
unattainable" language seriously, target management remains free to
raise significant barriers to a proxy contest.

Although the target

management cannot with certainty prevent a proxy fight from
succeeding and thereby eliminate any incentive to undertake one,
management can significantly reduce the likelihood of success.

This

is a serious concern, especially because, as Parts 3 and 4 have
shown, proxy contests can function poorly even when target management
respects the process.

How then can the Delaware Supreme Court get

out of the mess they made in Unitrin, without having simply to
announce they were wrong, a strategy that QVC demonstrates is not
attractive to them?46
46651

A.2d at 1388-89.

47In

QVC, the Supreme Court rejected its own formulation of the Revlon trigger set out in Time in favor of the
change of control test formulated by the Chancery Court in the same case. When confronted by counsel's claim that
Paramount had complied with the Supreme Court's Revlon standard, the Court responded by stating that "[t]he Paramount
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While there is room for the Supreme Court to reevaluate its
position in light of doctrinal ambiguity in the Unitrin opinion,47 the
more promising approach reflects comic Mel Brook's advice when
confronted with the need to respond to someone else's embarrassing
public behavior: "Be oblique."48

Central to Unitrin's favoring a

control shift through an election rather than a market is the
capacity of a poison pill to preclude a tender offer and the capacity
of target management to adopt a pill without shareholder approval.
Delaware's sympathetic treatment of the pill in Household
International was understandably a product of the unique
circumstances of the early 1980s -- a wave of hostile takeovers that
reasonable people honestly, if incorrectly, believed threatened the
economy, and the inaction of other institutions which left the
Delaware courts as the only policy maker that had to confront the
issue.49 Because shareholders could not be counted on to approve a pill, adoption was left to
management.

defendants have misread the holding of Time-Warner. ... The Paramount defendants' argument totally ignores the phrase
'without excluding other possibilities.'" 637 A.2d at 48. It would have been much more straightforward for the court to
have acknowledged that it had changed its mind.
48Vice-Chancellor Strine recently commented with refreshing candor that "Delaware's doctrinal approach [to

defensive tactics] is premised on the assumption that the world can be viewed clearly by simultaneously wearing three
pairs of eye glasses with different prescriptions (Unocal, business judgment, and entire fairness). It is not apparent that
this approach works any better in the law than it does in the field of optics." In re Gaylord Container Corporation
Shareholders Litigation, slip opinion at 32, n. 46.
49Mel

Brooks & Carl Reiner, The Two Thousand and Thirteen Year Old Man (1960).

50Gilson,

supra note 5.
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The crisis of the 1980s is past and large institutional shareholders routinely approve pills that are
not preclusive. In this calmer time, shareholder-adopted bylaws provide the opportunity to shrink the
influence of the pill, and therefore the effectiveness of the means through which the preference for
elections over markets operates. Equally important, given the Delaware Supreme Court's sensitivity to
acknowledging a mistake, this can be accomplished without directly confronting the line of cases
growing out of Household International.
The issue of the validity of shareholder-adopted bylaws that repeal an existing poison pill is now
working its way through the Delaware Courts. Many thoughtful Delaware lawyers take the position that
such bylaws violate §141(a)'s grant of managerial power to the board of directors, especially after the
Supreme Court in Mentor Graphics used that argument to avoid confronting the validity of a dead hand
or slow hand pill under Unocal. However, §141(a)'s grant of authority is qualified by the phrase
"except as otherwise permitted in this chapter or in the certificate of incorporation." Section 109(b) -obviously "in this chapter" -- authorizes shareholders to adopt bylaws containing "any provision, not
inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation,
the conduct of its affairs, and the rights and powers of its stockholder, directors, officers, or employees."
To the doctrinalist, §141(a)'s broad grant of authority to the directors by referring to the
"business and affairs of the corporation," juxtaposed with §109(b)'s equally broad grant of authority to
shareholders to adopt bylaws concerning "the business of the corporation [and] the conduct of its
affairs," makes relevant the Delaware doctrine of "equal dignity" or "independent legal significance."50
This doctrine, which invites corporate planners to choose among statutory alternatives for dealing with
precisely the same functional activity, is the very embodiment of Delaware's enabling approach to
corporate law.
Allowing shareholders to redeem poison pills or replace them with less expansive versions by
means of a bylaw provides a means for Delaware courts to retreat with dignity from the extreme position
51See Jeffrey Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An

Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 511 (1997).
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to which they were driven by the turmoil of the 1980s. To be sure, §109(b) was not initially intended
for this function, but Household International itself provides the response. Responding to the same
objection with respect to its broad reading of §157, the Supreme Court quoted Unocal:
"[O]ur corporate law is not static. It must grow and develop in response to, indeed in
anticipation of, evolving concepts and needs. Merely because the General Corporation law is silent as to
a specific matter does not mean that it is prohibited."
While the shareholder bylaw route still leaves the balance between shareholders and
management tipped toward management -- absent Household International, it would be better to require
the shareholders to seek repeal because of our rules for who bears the cost of proxy initiatives -- it does
allow shareholders to rebalance the preference among mechanisms for the transfer of control. This odd
strategy has some of the characteristics of a Rube Goldberg machine. The strategy reflects elements of
doctrinal elegance in deploying Delaware's strongly held but unpredictably applied penchant for
textualism reflected in both the equal dignity doctrine and Mentor Graphics, but it is less than a
complete fix. The need to operate through a shareholder-adopted bylaw implicates the very electoral
mechanism whose difficulties we have begun to explore above. Also, the strategy hardly commends
itself to corporate governance systems considering the issue that lack Delaware's peculiar history.
Therefore, other countries that must choose between elections and markets as mechanisms for the
transfer of corporate control would be well advised to deal with the issue directly in a statute rather than
obliquely. Because the case for elections seemingly cannot overcome a sensibly grounded presumption
in favor of markets, we now believe that any statute should require pills to receive shareholder approval
before becoming operative.
The amended proposed Thirteenth Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover Bids51
illustrates this more thoughtful approach. Two elements of the proposed directive are relevant here.
Article 3(c) states the general principle: "[T]he board of an offeree company ... must not deny the

51 Footnote

41

holders of securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the offer." Article 8 prevents this
principle from being given a Unitrin-like spin, according to which the holders may be forced to decide
on the merits of the offer through a proxy fight. Rather, under Article 8(a) the offeree company "should
abstain from completing any action other than seeking alternative bids which may result in the
frustration of the offer ... unless it has the prior authorization of the general meeting of the shareholders
given for this purpose ...." The brevity of this language would have given European Member States
significant flexibility in the framing of implementing legislation and also would have given European
takeover lawyers the ambiguity out of which to draw courts into an important role in the resolution of
takeover contests. The animating principle of the proposed Thirteenth Directive was apparent: markets
are preferred to elections as mechanisms to mediate the transfer of corporate control. Unfortunately, the
proposed directive, the result of the Conciliation process between the European Parliament, the
Commission and the Council of Ministers, was rejected in early July by an equally divided European
Parliament, with the virtually unanimous opposition of the German delegation driving the result. The
German change of heart was said to result from the successful hostile takeover of Mannesmann by
Vodaphone, a British company.52 We are thus reminded that the object of our study is, in the end, a
matter not just of economics, but of political economy.
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53

Company Law: Parliament No Vote Shreds Takeover Directive, European Information Services, European
Report, July 6, 2001; Business MEPs Miss Vote to Reform Company Law, Irish Independent, July 6, 2001.
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